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The Role of Performance 
Management in Good 
Governance and Its 
Application in Public 
Education
This article draws from the author’s 
chapter in The Political Economy of Good 
Governance (Asefa and Huang, eds.), which 
was recently published by the Upjohn 
Institute. To order the book, visit www.upjohn
.org/up_press, or see p. 7 for more details. 
Governance—laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, and administrative practices 
that prescribe and enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and services—
determines government performance 
(Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001). The role 
of performance management, in turn, 
is to shape how public sector agencies, 
programs, and activities are organized 
and managed to achieve public purposes 
and desired outcomes. 
The origins of performance 
management lie in a basic agency-
theory framework, where an owner hires 
managers and workers to generate profi ts 
(with the owner or manager acting as 
principal, and the workers as agents). 
The principal’s main objective is to 
design a contract that aligns principal 
and agent incentives and achieves the 
principal’s production objectives. This is 
made challenging, however, by the fact 
that these relationships are frequently 
typifi ed by confl icts in goals and values, 
as well as privately held information or 
information asymmetries.
It is here that a role for performance 
management enters in, in monitoring 
worker actions, outputs, and outcomes, 
and in developing an incentive scheme 
that aligns principal and agent interests—
essentially, a contractual relationship 
with performance expectations and 
credible provisions for enforcing it. 
However, even in a simple production 
system—where organizational goals 
and production tasks are known, a linear 
relationship exists between efforts and 
outputs, and there are relatively few 
variables for managers to control—an 
enforceable contract is diffi cult to 
achieve. 
One well-known problem is 
adverse selection, where employees’ 
true motivations or capabilities for 
producing a desired outcome are 
unknown. The second is moral hazard 
and unobservability, in which employees’ 
efforts or actions are not observable or 
readily measured, creating conditions that 
encourage shirking or distorted results. 
Recent headlines reporting cheating 
scandals in K–12 schools—under 
pressure to meet performance targets on 
standardized tests set by the No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) Act—are just one 
example of how these problems can 
undermine performance management 
efforts (Rich 2013). 
Yet many contracts and performance 
management systems still incorporate 
basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive 
schemes, largely because of their 
perceived simplicity and the signifi cant 
costs of establishing a more intricate 
contract or system of incentives. A 
straight-line approach typically defi nes 
a required (linear) rate of performance 
improvement from an initial score or 
target and may also specify an ending 
value corresponding to a maximum 
performance level, such as NCLB’s goal 
of 100 percent profi ciency in reading and 
mathematics for public school students 
(see Figure 1). NCLB also provides an 
example of an important shortcoming 
of straight-line models for establishing 
performance expectations: they are 
seldom constructed using empirical data 
that would generate realistic expectations 
for performance (Koretz and Hamilton 
2006). In fact, Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan acknowledged that the 
performance management system under 
NCLB evolved “from an instrument of 
reform into a barrier to reform” (U.S. 
Department of Education 2013, p. 1). 
From the start, the application 
of agency theory to the design of 
performance management systems in 
the public sector has been complex. 
First, just who is the principal in a given 
governance setting? Governance in 
the public sector is multilayered and 
dynamic. In addition, consensus or 
clarity on goals is often lacking among 
citizens, and sometimes in originating 
legislation as well. The public sector 
is also distinctive in that its primary 
work typically involves complex, 
nonmanual work, characterized by 
multilevel interactions and public-private 
sector partnerships. Nonstandardized 
outputs make the accurate measurement 
of performance and construction 
of performance benchmarks more 
challenging and more costly. Finally, 
the public sector is also distinct from 
the private sector in the extent to which 
political infl uences may be brought to 
bear at many different levels. Goals 
and priorities can change swiftly, and 
entire agencies or authority structures 
can be reorganized, as well as the foci of 
primary work. There is great potential for 
unintended consequences as performance 
management and the use of performance-
based contracts expand into uncharted 
public-sector territory (Koning and 
Heinrich 2013). 
Effective performance 
management demands clarity 
of goals and their translation 
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Applying Performance Management 
Bluntly in Public Education
We spend close to $600 billion 
annually on our public elementary and 
secondary school system, and the public 
is demanding greater accountability and 
results. Furthermore, public education 
today is characterized by elaborate 
governing structures with deeply layered 
and overlapping levels of decision 
making, widely varying views on 
appropriate means and ends for improving 
education, an increasingly complex 
technology with diverse outputs (which 
we subject to standardized measures of 
outcomes), and political infl uences that 
interject at many levels. Could the use 
of performance management potentially 
bring some clarity and coherence to K–12 
education governance?
We have proceeded full speed 
ahead with regimes for performance 
management and accountability in 
education that include strong incentives 
and high-stakes consequences for 
many stakeholders. NCLB marked the 
beginning of an assertive federal role 
in directing state and local practices to 
meet student performance standards. 
The federal government holds states, 
districts, and schools accountable for a 
comprehensive set of standards, including 
annual academic progress, teacher 
quality, and achievement gaps, and 
for developing assessments of student 
performance relative to those standards. 
NCLB defi nes educational success 
primarily based on standardized tests 
of students’ performance, and current 
funding and accountability systems 
presume “same-age cohorts of students 
proceeding in lockstep” (Wilson 2013, 
p. 96). Consistent with the origins of 
performance management, Darling-
Hammond (2002, p. 6) describes how 
our test-based accountability system 
refl ects a “factory-model approach” to 
education, in which schools are organized 
“to process large batches of students 
in assembly-line fashion rather than to 
ensure that students are well-known 
by their teachers and treated as serious 
learners.” 
Recently, recognition of the limitations 
of profi ciency measures under NCLB 
has propelled alternative approaches to 
measuring educational performance, 
particularly value-added measures. A 
basic value-added model compares the 
individual growth of a group of students 
(e.g., in a given classroom or school) 
to average growth of the population of 
interest (e.g., growth among all students 
in the state). Some value-added models 
are also constructed to account for 
factors outside the control of schools in 
estimating growth in student achievement 
over time. Although these are (arguably) 
better measures of performance than 
profi ciency levels, should society be 
ratcheting up the stakes that it attaches to 
them, as we have recently seen in some 
large, urban school districts?
One of the most controversial 
recent developments in performance 
management in education has been 
the high-profi le, public dissemination 
of value-added measures of teacher 
performance in large school districts, 
including in Los Angeles and New York. 
Calculated by third parties (outside 
the district), the value-added measures 
associated with specifi c teachers were 
published in the Los Angeles Times and 
by the New York City Department of 
Education.1 The objective was to get 
the performance information directly to 
citizen stakeholders, who could use this 
information and their political power 
to drive public-sector performance 
improvements.
However, in New York City, the 
margin of error in value-added measures 
was so wide that the average confi dence 
interval around each rating spanned 35 
percentiles in math and 53 percentiles 
in English, the city said. Some teachers 
were judged on as few as 10 students. 
In publishing the Los Angeles numbers, 
the L.A. Times acknowledged that 
value-added measures “do not capture 
everything about a teacher or school’s 
performance” (see Note 1). A study by 
Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet 
and Chiang 2010) fi nds that the error rate 
for value-added scores (based on three 
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore, 
a three-year model would rate one out 
Figure 2.1  Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for Increased 
Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested in Math, 2002–
2014  (% that must be met of students testing at the “profi cient” level)
NOTE:  The fi gure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve a rat-
ing of “profi cient” in testing for math under the legislation.  The bar for 2002, the fi rst year the 
law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as profi cient in math that 
year, and no improvement was required for the fi rst year following that. But thereafter, increasing 
percentages of profi ciency were set for each year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kin-
dergarteners through eighth graders were expected to be profi cient in math.  (The exception was 
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of every four teachers incorrectly, and 
with only one year of data, the error rate 
jumped to 35 percent. 
Lessons for Improving the Effectiveness 
of Performance Management 
What have we learned about the 
role of performance management in 
contributing to good governance and 
improving government outcomes? 
 The effective use of performance 
management demands clarity of goals 
and their translation into empirical 
measures that accurately and adequately 
characterize our intended outcomes. 
Where we fail on either of these 
components, the performance 
management system may risk doing more 
harm than good. In many cases, the data 
available simply are not up to the task. 
In light of these limitations, 
and recognizing that performance 
management often grapples with multiple 
goals and complex production, we may 
be better off with multidimensional 
measures of performance to guide our 
work. A number of school districts and 
states are now developing these types 
of multipurpose, multiple-indicator 
performance management systems 
for K–12 education (New York City 
Department of Education 2014). A 
potential trade-off, of course, is that a 
more intricate or complicated system 
and set of incentives would likely place 
a greater demand on public capacities for 
managing such a system.
 Caution should be exercised in 
attaching high stakes to performance 
results, given the known challenges 
and imperfections of our performance 
measures.
 The awarding of performance 
bonuses, “naming and shaming” (as 
in the publication of teacher value-
added), termination of contracts, or 
retractions of program funding would 
best be backed or verifi ed by multiple 
sources of quantitative and qualitative 
evidence before going forward. A 
counterargument frequently offered 
against eliminating high stakes altogether 
is that the performance management 
and incentive systems will lose their 
“teeth” and purpose. Evidence to date, 
however, suggests that individuals and 
organizations are highly responsive 
to performance standards, even when 
the rewards are minimal, such as peer 
recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006; 
Heinrich 2007).
 Performance management systems 
are likely to be more effective tools of 
governance if we focus more on their use 
for diagnostic purposes. 
That is, resources and rewards should 
follow their effective use in improving 
government and program outcomes, 
rather than for hitting performance 
targets. In the public education example, 
schools or teachers would be rewarded 
for using information on students’ 
performance to help increase their 
learning, ideally measured in terms 
of their individual growth that is not 
based solely on test score levels or 
gains. This would be a more appropriate 
outcome to report publicly (for the 
sake of transparency), and, if measured 
suffi ciently, would also reward the right 
types of efforts to increase performance, 
that is, not success in increasing test-
taking skills but rather effective use of 
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